



**Unemployment and Labor Market
Institutions:
Theory and Evidence from the GCC**

MOHAMED OSMAN SULIMAN
University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE
E-mail: Mohameds@Sharjah.ac.ae

AND

MAHMOUD SAMI NABI
LEGI-Polytechnic School of Tunisia; IHEC-Sousse-Tunisia
E-mail: nabi@univ-paris1.fr

International Conference on
"The Unemployment Crisis in the Arab Countries"
(17-18 March 2008, Cairo- Egypt)

I. Introduction:

The gush of oil prices in the seventies bolstered the Gulf Cooperation Countries Council (GCC) economies. The resulting ubiquitous growth of the GCC paved the way for an influx of foreign workers in their labor markets. However, oil prices tumbled sharply in the mid-eighties. The results were manifestly grave on the segmented labor market of the GCC. Unemployment for both national citizens of the Gulf and non-nationals, drastically, rose to unprecedented levels, reaching over 15 percent, for nationals, in some of these countries (Central Department of Statistics, Saudi Arabia, 2000). The policy implications of these shifts in the GCC's labor markets were far-reaching. The Gulf countries had to change their labor laws to protect their national citizens against foreign labor competition.

Numerous articles have been written on the nuances of the market segmentation issue of labor markets in the GCC and elsewhere. Piore (1979) delved the segmented market for migrant workers in industrial societies. Borjas (1994) discussed the economic aspects of immigration, with emphasis on the impact of Hispanic workers on the United States economy. Bartram (1998) wrote on the historical situation of foreign workers in Israel. Hiebert (1999) highlighted the influence of geographical localities on market segmentation in Canada. Said (2001), succinctly, explored the tendency of the Arab countries to reserve public sector employment to national citizens. Ali (2002) examined the relationship between education and the labor market, with special emphasis on the measurement of the returns to human capital. Albuainain (2004) reported that, despite the protection of domestic laws to nationals, their unemployment rate is actually higher than what the official reports show in Abu Dhabi. The market segmentation issue in the Arab world has been talked, among others, by Zind (2002) and Al-khouli (2007) who investigated the labor market in Saudi Arabia.

This paper examines the relationship of the labor market institutions and unemployment in the GCC. The paper deviates from previous work in several ways. It connects the market segmentation idea to the development of formal and informal markets. Empirically, this study simulates the theoretical model with GCC's unemployment for the period 1990-2007.

The next section presents the theoretical model. Section three examines the simulation results. The last section offers some concluding remarks.

II. The Model:

The model is a modified version of Helpman and Itskhoki (2007). It enables the institutional environment to affect job creation and therefore the unemployment level.

2.1. Agents

Agents are of two types: workers and stockholders. To present their consumption behavior we represent them by a representative agent who consumes a continuum $[0,1]$ of goods and which preferences are characterized by the following utility function

$$U = \left[\int_0^1 C(i)^\beta di \right]^{\frac{1}{\beta}}, \quad 0 < \beta < 1 \quad (1)$$

where $C(i)$ denotes the consumption of good i and β is a parameter that controls the elasticity of substitution between varieties. The problem of the representative agent is to maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint

$$\int_0^1 p(i)C(i)di = PC \quad (2)$$

where $p(i)$ is the price of the variety i , C is the total consumption of the differentiated good and P the price index defined as follows

$$P = \left[\int_0^1 p(i)^{-\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} di \right]^{-\frac{1-\beta}{\beta}} \quad (3)$$

Denoting R as the revenue of the representative agent we have $PC=R$, and the demand function representing the solution to the consumer maximization problem will be

$$C(i) = \frac{R}{P} \left(\frac{p(i)}{P} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \quad (4)$$

which implies that the demand for each variety depends on the total expenditure and on the relative price of the good $p(i)/P$.

2.2. Firms

The economy contains a continuum of mass 1 monopolistically competitive firms distributed on $[0,1]$. A firm that seeks to supply a good of variety i bears an entry cost which covers the technology cost. After bearing this cost, the firm learns how productive its technology is, as measured by a parameter θ_i distributed with a density $f(\theta_i)$ over $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ where $\underline{\theta} > 0$. For simplicity we consider a uniform distribution so that we have $f(\theta_i) = 1/(\bar{\theta} - \underline{\theta})$. If the technology productivity is not sufficiently high some firms find it optimal to move to the informal sector of the economy in order to reduce the labour cost. The proportion of formal and informal firms will be endogenously determined. Before, we present the production technology. A good i producing firm uses labour in quantity h_i to produce a quantity $y(i)$ according to the following production technology

$$y(i) = \theta_i h_i \quad (5)$$

and is constrained by the demand function

$$y(i) = C(i) \quad (6)$$

In order to rewrite this constraint in equivalent manner note that the representative agent's income R is equal to the production value of firms. Indeed, this production value is

distributed to workers and stockholders. Hence, we have $R = Py$ where P is the price index given by (3) and y is the production index given by

$$y = C = \left[\int_0^1 y(i)^\beta di \right]^{\frac{1}{\beta}} \quad (7)$$

Using (4) and (7) the demand constraint (6) becomes

$$y(i) = y \left(\frac{p(i)}{P} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}}$$

2.2.1. The formal firms

The formal firms face hiring costs of labor. A firm i that seeks to employ h_i workers bears the hiring cost bh_i where $b > 0$ is a constant term which measures the degree of frictions in the labor market. Higher values of b correspond to countries having low efficient labor market institutions. Workers hired by formal firms have a bargaining power in the wage determination process. Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996), bargaining between the workers and the formal firm leads to the following distribution of revenue: the firm gets a share $1/(1+\beta)$ and the workers get a share $\beta/(1+\beta)$. This result is derived under the assumption that at the bargaining stage a worker's outside option is unemployment, and the value of unemployment is normalized to zero (no unemployment benefits). Note that since $\beta < 1$ the share of workers never exceeds the half of the revenue. A firm chooses an employment level that maximizes its share of revenue minus hiring costs. That is, it chooses h_i to maximize

$$\pi_i = \frac{p(i)y_i}{1+\beta} - bh_i$$

Therefore, the formal firm problem is

$$\begin{cases} \max_{h_i} \pi_i = \frac{p(i)y_i}{1+\beta} - bh_i \\ s.c. \\ y(i) = \theta_i h_i \\ y(i) = y \left(\frac{p(i)}{P} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \end{cases}$$

The solution is characterized by

$$h_i^* = \theta_i^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \left(\frac{\beta P}{b(1+\beta)} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} y \quad (8)$$

$$y^*(i) = \theta_i h_i^* \quad (9)$$

$$\pi_i^* = \frac{b(1-\beta)}{\beta} h_i^* \quad (10)$$

Since the workers receive the fraction $\beta/(1+\beta)$ of $p(i)y^*(i)$ out of wages w , we have

$$\frac{\beta}{1+\beta} p(i)y^*(i) = h_i^* w \text{ which yields } w = b.$$

2.2.2. The informal firms

When the technology productivity is not sufficiently high some firms have an incentive to move to the informal sector of the economy. Informal firms don't support the hiring costs of labor. Besides, they have an infinite bargaining power that forces workers to accept a predetermined wage \underline{w} which is lower than the wage offered in the formal sector $\underline{w} < w = b$. Indeed, workers are not organized in unions when they are hired by informal firms. However, becoming an informal firm lowers the technology productivity to its minimum level $\underline{\theta}$. This can be justified by the denied access to some public services for informal firms or by the necessity to support delocalization and additional transport costs. The informal firm chooses an employment level that maximizes its profit and its maximisation problem is given by

$$\begin{cases} \max_{h_i} \pi_i = \pi_i = p(i)y_i - \underline{w}h_i \\ s.c \\ y(i) = \underline{\theta}h_i \\ y(i) = y \left(\frac{p(i)}{P} \right)^{-\frac{1}{1-\beta}} \end{cases}$$

The solution is characterized by

$$\tilde{h}_i^* = \tilde{h}^* = \underline{\theta}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \left(\frac{\beta P}{\underline{w}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} y \quad (11)$$

$$\tilde{y}^*(i) = \tilde{y}^* = \underline{\theta}h^* \quad (12)$$

$$\tilde{\pi}_i^* = \frac{\underline{w}(1-\beta)\tilde{h}^*}{\beta} \quad (13)$$

A firm decides to move to informal activity if it provides it with a higher profit i.e. if $\tilde{\pi}_i^* > \pi_i^*$. Using (10) and (13) it is simple to show that this the case if the technology productivity is below a threshold $\tilde{\theta}$ given by

$$\tilde{\theta} = \underline{\theta} \left(\frac{b}{\underline{w}} \right) (1+\beta)^{1/\beta} > \underline{\theta}$$

Hence, all firms with a productivity in $[\underline{\theta}, \tilde{\theta}]$ become informal whereas firms having a productivity in $[\tilde{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ choose to be formal. Note that $\partial \tilde{\theta} / \partial b > 0$ which signifies that countries with weaker labor market institutions have larger informal sector.

2.3. Labor market institutions and unemployment

Proposition 1

For a given institutional environment, allowing informal activity increases job creation.

Proof

Using equations (8) and (11) it is easy to show the following equation

$$h_i^* = \tilde{h}^* \left(\theta_i / \hat{\theta} \right)^{\beta/1-\beta} \quad (14)$$

where

$$\hat{\theta} = \underline{\theta} \left(\frac{b}{\underline{w}} \right)^{1/\beta} (1 + \beta)^{1/\beta} > \tilde{\theta}$$

Hence, a firm i that belongs to the informal sector $\theta_i < \tilde{\theta}$ creates more jobs compared to a situation where it has no choice but producing as a formal firm. Indeed, from (14) we have

$$\tilde{h}^* > h_i^* \quad //$$

$$H = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\tilde{\theta}} \tilde{h}^* f(\theta_i) d\theta_i + \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} h_i^* f(\theta_i) d\theta_i$$

Proposition 2

i) If the institutional environment is initially sufficiently weak:

$$b > \bar{b} = \frac{\underline{w}}{\beta(1+\beta)^{1/\beta}}$$

then improving it (a reduction of b) enhances job creation ($\partial H / \partial b < 0$) and reduces unemployment (for a given number of potential workers).

ii) If the institutional environment is initially sufficiently developed $b < \bar{b}$ then reducing it (an increase of b) increases job creation ($\partial H / \partial b > 0$) and reduces unemployment (for a given number of potential workers).

Proof: see the appendix.

III. Simulations:

Calibrating the model using the unemployment data in the GCC countries between 1990 and 2007 enables us to compare the results of the model to the effective evolution of the unemployment rate. The sample countries and the data sources are presented in tables 1 and 2, respectively. We will present the methodology of the parameters calibration.

The institutional environment is represented in this simulation by social insurance which is captured through oil prices. Hence, an increase in oil prices is assumed to lead to higher social insurance and therefore to higher cost of hiring labour (b). We choose the parameters in order to minimize the error between the effective unemployment rate (U) and the simulated unemployment rate (U'). The effective unemployment rate is constructed as a weighted average of the unemployment rate of nationals and non-nationals. The weights are the shares

of national and non-national labour-force in the GCC countries which are respectively assumed to equal 26% and 74%¹.

Assuming that the labour supply is fixed (N) the simulated unemployment rate is given by

$$U' = 1 - \frac{H}{N}$$

Where H, as proved in the appendix of proposition 2, is given by

$$H = \frac{\beta \tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta} + (1-\beta)\tilde{\theta}^{\beta/\beta-1} (\tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta} - \tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta})}{\underline{w} \tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta} + (1-\beta)\tilde{\theta}^{\beta/\beta-1} (\tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta} - \tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta})}$$

The parameters of the model are calculated to minimize the error $U - U'$. The results are the following:

<< Statistics `LinearRegression`


$\beta = 0.81;$
 $vb = 4;$
 $\theta_{min} = 10;$
 $\theta_{max} = 200;$

Regress[TDD, {1, $\frac{\beta}{vb} * \frac{\theta_{min} * (1 + \beta)^{1/\beta} * (x / vb) - \theta_{min}}{\theta_{min} * (1 + \beta)^{1/\beta} * (x / vb) - \theta_{min} + (1 - \beta) * \left((\theta_{min} * (1 + \beta) * (x / vb))^{\frac{\beta}{\beta-1}} \right) \left((\theta_{max})^{\frac{1}{-\beta-1}} - (\theta_{min} * (1 + \beta) * (x / vb))^{\frac{1}{-\beta-1}} \right)}$ }, x]

	Estimate	SE	TStat	PValue		
{ParameterTable → ¹	3.41475	0.142838	23.9064	6.01741 × 10 ⁻¹⁴		
	-4.36368	1.3056	-3.34229	0.00413397		
	, RSquared → 0.411					
	DF	SumOfSq	MeanSq	FRatio	PValue	
AdjustedRSquared → 0.37433, EstimatedVariance → 0.250483, ANOVATable →	Model	1	2.79812	2.79812	11.1709	0.00413397
	Error	16	4.00773	0.250483		
	Total	17	6.80584			

The following figure presents the effective and the simulated unemployment rate with the oil price (divided by 10).

¹ GCC, STATISTICAL BULLETIN VOLUME-TWELVE, 2003;



The figure shows that our model captures the effect of higher variation of the oil price on the unemployment rate. Indeed, it replicates very well the decline in unemployment rate after the acceleration of oil price during the period 2002-2007. However, it is not very insightful before this period which means that other factors have caused unemployment to decrease. The paucity of the labor market data in the GCC makes the empirical investigation of these other variables difficult.

Such simulation results amplify our second theoretical proposition 2. Interpreting, cautiously, proposition two, it elucidates that if social insurance is initially weak, then its increase reduces the formal sector and enlarges the informal sector. The increase in Informal firms creates more jobs than those lost by the remaining formal firms.

IV. Concluding Remarks:

This paper examines theoretically and empirically the relationship between social insurance, an important labor market institution, and unemployment in the GCC. In the theoretical section the model elucidates the relationship between labor market institutions and unemployment in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Two propositions are pondered: (1) allowing informal activity bolsters job creation, and (2) If the institutional environment is initially, sufficiently, weak, then mitigating it will lower unemployment. Simulating the model with the GCC's unemployment for the period 1990-2007 allows us to decipher the validity of the model. The institutional environment is represented in this simulation by social insurance which is captured through oil prices. Hence, an increase in oil prices is assumed to lead to higher social insurance and, therefore, to higher cost of hiring labour. The parameters are selected with the objective of minimizing the error gap between the effective unemployment rate and the simulated unemployment rate. The effective unemployment rate is constructed as a weighted average of the unemployment rate of nationals and non-nationals. The weights are the shares of national and non-national labour-force in the GCC countries. Expositional simulations verified the second proposition. Thus, improving labor market institutions, that are initially weak may discernibly alleviate unemployment problems in the GCC.

References:

Albuainain, Reem M., Unemployment Rate in the United Arab Emirates: The Case of Abu Dhabi, Economic Research Forum, Working Paper 0404, 2004.

Ali, A.A., On the Relationship between Education , the Labor Market and the Measurement of Returns to Human Capital, in Al-Kawaz, Enhancing link between Education and Labor Market in the Arab Countries, Ch.2, 2002.

Al-Khouli, Sayid F. Ahmed, Labor Shortages, Migration and Segmentation: The Case of Saudi Labour Market 2007; <http://inmgard-conix-shifting.de/fileadmin/user-upload/pdf/roundtable07/mahdi.pdf>.

Arellano M, Bond S. Some Test of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies 1991; 58; 277-297.

Bartram, D.V., Foreign Workers in Israel: History and Theory, International Migration Review 1998; 32,2;303-325.

Borjas, George, The Economics of Immigration ,Journal of Economic Literature 1994;32.

Central Department Of Statistics CDs, Bulletin of Labor Force, 2000.

Hansen , L.P. and K.J. Singleton, Generalized Instrumental Variable Estimation of Nonlinear Rational Expectation Models, Econometrica, 50; 1269-1286.

Helpman, E. and O. Itskhoki (2007), "Labor Market Rigidities, Trade and unemployment," NBER Working Paper 13365.

Hiebert, Daniel, Local Geographies of Labor Market Segmentation: Motreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, Economic Geography, 1991;75,4;339-369.

Holtz-Eaken D, Newey W, Rosen H. Estimating Vector Autoregressions with Panel Data. Econometrica 1988;56,6

Montagna, C. (1995), "Monopolistic Competition with Firm-Specific Costs," Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 47, No. 2., pp. 318-328.

Nair-Reichert U, Weinhold D. Causality Tests for Cross-Country Panels: New Look at FDI and Economic Growth in Developing Countries. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 2001;63,2; 153-71

Piore, Michal J., Birds of Passage : Migrant Labor and Industrial Societies, 1979, Cambridge University Press, London.

Said, M, Public Sector Employment and Labor Market in the Arab Countries, in Djavad Salehi-Ishfahani, Labor and Human Capital in the Middle East , Ithaca Press in Association with the Economic Research Forum, 2001, Cairo.

Stole, L. A. and J. Zwiebel (1996), “ Intra-Firm Bargaining Under Non- Binding Contracts,”
Review of Economic Studies 63,pp.375-410

Zind, Richard G, Characteristics and Gaps in the GCC Labor Market, in Al-Kawaz,
Enhancing link between Education and Labor Market in the Arab Countries, Ch.4, 2002.

Table (1)
List of Countries

Countries
Bahrain
Kuwait
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
UAE

Table 2
Definitions of Variables

Variable Name	Definition	Source
Unemployment (U)	Overall unemployment in the nation	Ministries of planning and labor of the respective countries
Social welfare (insurance) (SI)	Social insurance proxied by oil prices	See oil prices
Oil prices	Used as an instrumental variable and a proxy for social insurance	U.S. Energy information Agency
COL	Cost of living Index	World Bank Development Indicators (WB)
GI	Gini Index, Consumption or income Distribution	WB
INC	Income (GNI) per capita	WB
Ed	Education (Adult Literacy)	WB
Prod	productivity	WB

Appendix:

The production index can be written as following

$$y = \left(\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\tilde{\theta}} [\tilde{y}^*(i)]^\beta f(\theta_i) d\theta_i + \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} [y^*(i)]^\beta f(\theta_i) d\theta_i \right)^{1/\beta}$$

Using (8), (9), (11) et (12) and normalizing the revenue R to 1 (which yields $P \square^1 = y$) we obtain

$$y = \left(\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\tilde{\theta}} \left(\frac{\beta \theta}{\underline{w}} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i + \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left(\frac{\beta \theta_i}{b(1+\beta)} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i \right)^{\frac{1-\beta}{\beta}} \quad (19)$$

From equation (14) we have

$$\begin{aligned} H &= \tilde{h}^* \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\tilde{\theta}} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i + \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left(\theta_i / \hat{\theta} \right)^{\beta/1-\beta} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i \right] \\ &= \underline{\theta}^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} \left(\frac{\beta}{\underline{w}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\beta}} y^{\frac{-\beta}{1-\beta}} \left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\tilde{\theta}} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i + \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left(\theta_i / \hat{\theta} \right)^{\beta/1-\beta} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i \right] \end{aligned}$$

replacing y by the expression given by (15) we obtain

$$H = \frac{\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\tilde{\theta}} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i + \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left(\frac{\theta_i}{\hat{\theta}} \right)^{\beta/1-\beta} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i}{\left[\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\tilde{\theta}} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i + \int_{\tilde{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \left(\frac{\theta_i}{\hat{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\beta}{1-\beta}} f(\theta_i) d\theta_i \right]} \left(\frac{\beta}{\underline{w}} \right)$$

Where

$$\hat{\theta} = \underline{\theta} \left(\frac{\beta}{\underline{w}} \right) (1 + \beta) < \bar{\theta}$$

Using the assumption that the distribution function is uniform over $[\underline{\theta}, \bar{\theta}]$ we obtain

$$H = \frac{\beta \frac{\tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta}}{\bar{\theta} - \underline{\theta}} + (1 - \beta) \hat{\theta}^{\beta/\beta - 1} \frac{\tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta} - \underline{\theta}^{1/1-\beta}}{\bar{\theta} - \underline{\theta}}}{\frac{\underline{w} \tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta}}{\bar{\theta} - \underline{\theta}} + (1 - \beta) \hat{\theta}^{\beta/\beta - 1} \frac{\tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta} - \underline{\theta}^{1/1-\beta}}{\bar{\theta} - \underline{\theta}}}$$

Or equivalently

$$H = \frac{\beta \tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta} + (1-\beta)\hat{\theta}^{\beta/\beta-1}(\bar{\theta}^{1/1-\beta} - \tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta})}{w \tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta} + (1-\beta)\hat{\theta}^{\beta/\beta-1}(\bar{\theta}^{1/1-\beta} - \tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta})}$$

Using the following relation

$$\hat{\theta}^{\beta/\beta-1} = \frac{\hat{\theta}^{1/\beta-1}}{\hat{\theta}} = \frac{\hat{\theta}^{\beta/\beta-1}}{\hat{\theta}}$$

H can be rewritten as follows

$$H = \frac{\beta \tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta} + \frac{\hat{\theta}}{\tilde{\theta}}g}{w \tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta} + g}$$

Where g is defined by

$$g = (1 - \beta)\hat{\theta}^{\beta/\beta-1} (\bar{\theta}^{1/1-\beta} - \tilde{\theta}^{1/1-\beta})$$

Note that g and $\frac{\hat{\theta}}{\tilde{\theta}}$ are decreasing with b whereas $\tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta}$ is increasing with b. Analysing $\tilde{\theta} - \underline{\theta} + g$ it is simple to show that it is increasing in b if $b > \bar{b} = \frac{w}{\beta(1+\beta)^{1/\beta}}$. Note also that

in this case, the numerator of H increases more with b due to the brake effect of $\frac{\hat{\theta}}{\tilde{\theta}}$ on g. Therefore we have all elements necessarily to show that H is decreasing with b ($\partial H/\partial b < 0$).

Similarly if $b < \bar{b}$ we obtain $(\partial H/\partial b) > 0$. Finally, if the number of potential workers is given for example equal to N then the unemployment is given by $U=N-H$ and $(\partial U/\partial b) = -(\partial H/\partial b)$.